Sommaire :
1. Introduction

Part 1. Static bilateral contracting
2. Hidden information, screening
3. Hidden information, signaling
4. Hidden action, moral hazard
5. Disclosure of private certifiable information
6. Multidimensional incentive problems

Part 2. Static multilateral contracting
7. Multilateral asymmetric information : bilateral trading and auctions
8. Multiagent moral hazard and collusion

Part 3. Repeated bilateral contracting
9. Dynamic adverse selection
10. Dynamic moral hazard

Part 4. Incomplete contracts
11. Incomplete contracts and institution design
12. Foundations of contracting with unverifiable information
13. Markets and contracts
14. Exercises

Langue : Anglais

Lieu d'édition : TORONTO

Localisation : Bibliothèque Campus de Nice

Support : Papier

Etat : Présent

Propriétaire : Bibliothèque