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Sommaire : Contents

Preface

1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations
Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence
Basic Concepts of Decision Theory
Axioms
The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem
Equivalent Representations
Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems
Limitations of the Bayesian Model
Domination
Proofs of the Domination Theorems
Exercises

2. Basic Models
Games in Extensive Form
Strategic Form and the Normal Representation
Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games
Reduced Normal Representations
Elimination of Dominated Strategies
Multiagent Representations
Common Knowledge
Bayesian Games
Modeling Games with Incomplete Information
Exercises

3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games
Domination and Ratonalizability
Nash Equilibrium
Computing Nash Equilibria
Significance of Nash Equilibria
The Focal-Point Effect
The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games
Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance
Two-Person Zero-Sum Games
Bayesian Equilibria
Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria
Auctions
Proof of Existence of Equilibrium
Infinite Strategy Sets
Exercises

4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games
Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies
Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies
Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability
Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States
Computing Sequential Equilibria
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria
Games with Perfect Information
Adding Chance Events with Small Probability
Forward Induction
Voting and Binary Agendas
Technical Proofs
Exercises

5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form
Introduction
Perfect Equilibria
Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria
Proper Equilibria
Persistent Equilibria
Stable Sets 01 Equilibria
Generic Properties
Conclusions
Exercises

6. Games with Communication
Contracts and Correlated Strategies
Correlated Equilibria
Bayesian Games with Communication
Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems
Trading Problems with Linear Utility
General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts
Sender-Receiver Games
Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria
Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games
Exercises
Bibliographic Note

7. Repeated Games
The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma
A General Model of Repeated Garnet
Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting
Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples
General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games
Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt
Imperfect Observability of Moves
Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups
Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
Continuous Time
Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games
Exercises

8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games
Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory
Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution
Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility
Transferable Utility
Rational Threats
Other Bargaining Solutions
An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game
An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information
A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game
Renegotiation
Exercises

9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games
Introduction to Coalitional Analysis
Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility
The Core
The Shapkey Value
Values with Cooperation Structures
Other Solution Concepts
Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility
Cores without Transferable Utility
Values without Transferable Utility
Exercises
Bibliographic Note

10. Cooperation under Uncertainty
Introduction
Concepts of Efficiency
An Example
Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers
Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms
Inscrutability and Durability
Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal
Neutral Bargaining Solutions
Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information
Exercises

Bibliography

Langue : Anglais

Lieu d'édition : CAMBRIDGE

Illustration(s) : Schémas

Localisation : Bibliothèque Campus de Nice

Support : Papier

Etat : Présent

Propriétaire : Bibliothèque