A theory of the firm : governance, residual claims and organizational forms.
No. | Call n° | Bar code | Commentary | |
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1 | [available] |
Contents : Contents
Introduction
Part 1. . Corporate Governance and the Market for Corporate Control
1. U.S. Corporate Governance : Lessons from the 1980s
2. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
3. Active Investors, LBOs and the Privatization of Bankruptcy
Part 2. Agency Costs, Residual Claims and Incentives
4. Theory of the Firm : Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure
5. Stockholder, Manager and Creditor Interests : Applications of Agency Theory
6. Rights and Production Functions : An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination
7. Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions
8. The Distribution of Power among Corporate Managers, Shareholders and Directors
Language : English
Place of publishing : CAMBRIDGE
Location : Nice Library
Material : Paper
Statement : Présent
Owner : Bibliothèque