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1

A theory of the firm : governance, residual claims and organizational forms.

JENSEN Michael C.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

2003

311

0674012291

111.23-JENSE

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ; SHAREHOLDER ; INTEREST RATE


Number of copies : 1
No. Call n° Bar code Commentary
1 [available]

Contents : Contents

Introduction

Part 1. . Corporate Governance and the Market for Corporate Control
1. U.S. Corporate Governance : Lessons from the 1980s
2. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
3. Active Investors, LBOs and the Privatization of Bankruptcy

Part 2. Agency Costs, Residual Claims and Incentives
4. Theory of the Firm : Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure
5. Stockholder, Manager and Creditor Interests : Applications of Agency Theory
6. Rights and Production Functions : An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination
7. Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions
8. The Distribution of Power among Corporate Managers, Shareholders and Directors

Language : English

Place of publishing : CAMBRIDGE

Location : Nice Library

Material : Paper

Statement : Présent

Owner : Bibliothèque