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Organization at the limit : lessons from the Columbia disaster.

STARBUCK William H. ; FARJOUN Moshe

BLACKWELL PUBLISHING

2005

387

111.87-STARB

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE ; ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE ; AERONAUTICS SECTOR ; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ; CASE


Number of copies : 1
No. Call n° Bar code Commentary
1 [available]

Comment :

ISBN 13 : 978-1405131087

Contents : Contents

Contributeurs : Diane Vaughan, Karlene H. Roberts, Peter M. Madsen, Vinit M. Desai, Willie Ocasio, Sally Blount, Mary Waller, Sophie Leroy, Angela Buljan, Zur Shapira, Karl Weick, Scott A. Snook, Jeffrey C. Connor, Raghu Garud, Roger Dunbar, Amy C. Edmondson, Michael A. Roberto, Richard M.J. Bohmer, Erika M. Ferlins, Laura R. Feldman , Frances Milliken, Theresa K. Lant, Ebony Bridwell-Mitchell, Nancy Leveson, Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, John S. Carroll, Betty Barrett, Alexander Brown, Nicolas Dulac, Lydia Fraile, Karen Marais, David Woods, Johnny Stevenson , Henry McDonald
Foreword : Sean O'Keefe.

Part 1. Introduction.
1. Introduction : Organizational Aspects of the Columbia Disaster

Part 2. The Context of the Disaster.
2. History and Policy in the Space Shuttle Program
3. System Effects : On Slippery Slopes, Repeating Negative Patterns and Learning from Mistake ?
4. Organizational Learning and Action in the Midst of Safety Drift : Revisiting the Space Shuttle Program's Recent History
5. The Space Between in Space Transportation: A Relational Analysis of the Failure of STS-107

Part 3. Influences on decision making.
6. The Opacity of Risk : Language and the Culture of Safety in NASA's Space Shuttle Program
7 Coping with Temporal Uncertainty: When Rigid, Ambitious Deadlines Don't Make Sense
8. Attention to Production Schedule and Safety as Determinants of Risk-Taking in NASA's Decision to Launch the Columbia Shuttle

Part 4. The Imaging Debate.
9. Making Sense of Blurred Images: Mindful Organizing in Mission STS-107
10. The Price of Progress: Structurally Induced Inaction
11. Data Indeterminacy: One NASA, Two Modes
12. The Recovery Window: Organizational Learning Following Ambiguous Threats
13. Barriers to the Interpretation and Diffusion of Information about Potential Problems in Organizations: Lessons from the Space Shuttle Columbia

Part 5. Beyond Explanation.
14. Systems Approaches to Safety : NASA and the Space Shuttle Disasters
15. Creating Foresight: Lessons for Enhancing Resilience from Columbia
16. Making NASA More Effective
17. Observations on the Columbia Accident

Part 6. Conclusion.

Language : English

Figure(s) : Schémas

Location : Nice Library

Material : Paper

Statement : Présent

Owner : Bibliothèque